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Michael V. Coyle*

Sobeys Stores Limitedv.
Yeomans et aL"A Case
Comment

1.
In Sobeys Store Limited v. Yeomans et aLI the Appeal Division of the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court seems to strike down the provisions of the
provincial Labour Standards Code 2 that make reinstatement a viable
remedy for senior workers who have been dismissed without just cause.
In reality, the judgement, now on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada, may have missed its mark by a wide margin and, despite the
obvious intention of the Court, left these very provisions untouched in the
result.
In any event, the case brings the flaws of the current judicial approach
to constitutional review under s.96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 into
bold relief. It reveals a disturbingly antiquated notion about the proper
role and function of administrative tribunals within the provincial
judicature. It betrays a remarkable insensitivity towards the social policy
objectives of provincial legislation designed to improve conditions of
work through minimum labour standards legislation. Indeed, this coldly
mechanical and unteleological judgement stands as something of a
monument to judicial formalism and calls into question the very
propriety of this head of constitutional review.
Mr. Clifford Yeomans was the manager of a Sobeys supermarket in
Dartmouth. Sobeys is a large, closely-held company bearing the name of
a prominent Nova Scotian family. The company has a string of
supermarkets throughout the Atlantic region. Mr. Yeomans had been
employed by Sobeys, steadily working his way up through the ranks for
over ten years when, in August of 1983, he was fired.
The reason for dismissal given by the employer at the hearing at first
instance before the Nova Scotia Labour Standards Tribunal (and
apparently taken as a fact by the appeal court)3 was "unsatisfactory
performance". The Tribunal, however, concluded that there was "no
evidence that Sobeys attempted any other disciplinary measures short of
dismissal", nor did the employer "fulfil their duty to provide sufficient
*LL.B. Dalhousie, 1987. The original version of this article was prepared in the context of a
seminar on employment law taught by Professor Susan Ashley at Dalhousie University.
1. Reported at (1986), 70 N.S.R. (2d) 391.
2. S.N.S. 1972, c.10 as am. by 1974, c.29, 1975, c.50, 1976, c.41, 1977, c.18, 1978, c.42.
3. Sobeys, supro, note I at 393.
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notice to Mr. Yeomans that they viewed his performance as being
incompetent such that it would warrant dismissal". Clearly, it was the

employer's performance in this connection that the Tribunal saw to be

"unsatisfactory". "An employee", the Tribunal opined, "should not have
to come before the Labour Standards Tribunal or a court of law to find
'4
out why he was dismissed."
Applying the doctrine of progressive discipline s found in the arbitral
(but not the common law) 6 standard of "just cause" for dismissal,7 the
Tribunal held that Mr. Yeomans had been dismissed without just cause,
contrary to s.67A(1) of the Labour Standards Code. Accordingly, the
Tribunal ordered Mr. Yeomans reinstated to his position without loss of
seniority or employment benefits and that he be paid for wages lost. On
appeal,8 the Appeal Division held s.67A(2) and (3) of the Code contrary
to s.96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and, hence, ultra vires the
Legislature. The order of the Tribunal was vacated on that basis.
On its face, Sobeys v. Yeomans turns on the constitutionality of the
power given the Director of Labour Standards and the Tribunal in turn
under the Code to receive and consider complaints of dismissal without
just cause from workers with at least ten years seniority and to order,
inter alit, their reinstatement. In essence, the appeal court stated that this
is a matter within the exclusive competence of a federally appointed court
of superior jurisdiction, by virtue of s.96.
When a senior employee is fired he or she loses a lot. Beyond the job
itself and the income it brings, the employee loses the contribution of
labour over a substantial part of a working career in addition to any other
employment opportunities foregone. Typically, there are social
attachments formed in the community by the employee (and family)
which may well depend on a certain job with a certain employer in a
certain place. Not unusually, a family home has been established. Fired
senior employees lose self-esteem and the prestige that attaches
(especially in this day and age) to long-term employment and, most of all,
the employee loses accrued seniority and the security that, nominally at
least, goes with it. The social and psychological impact of firing on a
senior employee is, for these reasons, arguably greater than on a more
4. Id-394.
5. Brown and Beatty, CanadianLabourArbitration(1984), at 490.
6. Robinson v. CanadianAcceptance CorporationLi. (1971), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 226 (C.A.);
Morrell v. Grafion-FraserIna (1982), 51 N.S.R. (2d) 138 (C.A.); Christie, Employment Law
in Canada(1980), at 239-40.
7. Brown and Beatty, supra, note 5 at 349. See also: R. v. Arthurs, Ex p. Port Arthur
Shipbuilding Co. (1967), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 342 (Ont. C.A.) per Laskin, J.A. at 362-63, rev'd 70
D.L.R. (2d) 693 (S.C.C.).
8. By virtue of s.18(2) of the Code, there is a right of appeal from the Tribunal to the Appeal
Division of the Supreme Court on a question of law orjurisdiction.
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junior worker and carl be traumatic, even devastating, and adversely
affect the worker's very employability.
And when a senior worker is fired without just cause the remedy most
desired, understandably enough, is that of reinstatement. For both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary reasons, reinstatement is the only remedy
capable in many cases of real restitutio in integrum. Yet, it is the very
remedy that the courts of common law and equity have refused to grant
to this very day.1
Moreover, the common law entitles an employee who is dismissed
without cause merely to notice of dismissal or to pay in lieu thereof. 10 If,
however, the employer has cause at common law, even if the cause is not
revealed to the worker or even known at the time to the employer, no
notice of dismissal is required at all and dismissal is the only recognized
response: there are no "shades of discipline" at common law." Nor is an
employer required to give warnings of any kind to an employee prior to
2
dismissal or even to give reasons for the dismissal.'
The juridicial basis for the harsh refusal of the common law to grant
reinstatement (specific performance of the employment contract) is
threefold. First, since specific performance is an equitable remedy and it
would be tantamount to slavery to require an employee to work for a
certain employer against his will, the doctrine of mutuality dictates that
such equitable relief should not be available such as to force an employer
to continue to employ a worker he does not want.' 3 It has been
convincingly argued, however, that there is, in reality, nothing like
"mutuality" present in the employer-employee relationship: 4 individual
employees generally have very little real bargaining power and the noation
of freedom of contract does not bear up under close inspection. Second,
the courts have sought to justify the rule by saying that reinstatement
would require the constant supervision of the court and, hence, is an
impractical remedy.' 5 It is difficult to see why it would either require
constant supervision or be so impractical given the established procedures
and sanctions available to enforce court orders (including but not limited
to contempt proceedings) and the fact that reinstatement is not only
9. Christie, supra,at 385-86; Clarke v. Price(1819), 2 Wils. Ch. 157; Dupre QuarriesLtd v.
Dupre, [193414 D.L.R. 618 (S.C.C.); GeneralMotors of Canadav. Brunet (1977), 13 N.R.
233 (S.C.C.); Savagev. UnitedElasticLtd(1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 571 (N.S.S.C., TD.).
10. Robinson,supra,note 6.
11. Freedland, The ContractofEmployment (1977), at 226-27.
12. Christie, supra,note 6 at 234-40.
13. Christie, Id; Freedland, supra, note 11 at 272-78; Howarth v. City of Prince George
(1957), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 752 (B.C.S.C.).
14. Clarke, 32 Mod. L. Rev. 532 at 538; Freedland, supra,note 11 at 276-77.
15. Christie, supra,note 6 at 239.
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available but routinely awarded in other settings without apparent
difficulty. And third, the courts have labelled reinstatement as "contrary
to public policy" where mutual confidence no longer subsists between
employer and employee.' 6 It can hardly be suggested that reinstatement
is any longer against public policy in Nova Scotia in light of s.67A(1).
Further, as Professor Christie points out, reinstatement was apparently
never against public policy for the holders of public office 17 and, of
course, reinstatement is almost invariably awarded pursuant to the job
security provisions of collective agreements where the worker is
dismissed without just cause.18
Quite clearly, the common law is out of step with the realities of the
contemporary workplace. Its quaint notions about "mutuality" and
subsisting personal confidences and the attendant social values remain as
relics from days gone by when the employment relationship (or, more
accurately, the relationship of master to servant) was both more personal
and personalized. The common law approach conjures up images of
England as a "nation of shopkeepers" each with a houseful of domestic
servants to keep in line. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that rules made
by lawyers would be more attuned to the modem conditions of work.
Lawyers who become judges, after all, have for the most part spent their
entire working lives not as employees but as partners, public office
holders or tenured academics.
Meanwhile, pursuant to various statutory reforms that recognized the
right of workers to join unions and bargain collectively for improved
benefits and conditions of work19 - and with precious little help from
the common law courts - employers and employees were busily
inserting job security provisions ("just cause" clauses) into their collective
agreements and arbitrators were just as diligently defining and refining
the rights of workers under those clauses to disciplinary warnings and
20
progressive discipline.
It was against this social and legal background 2' that, in 1972, the
Nova Scotia Legislature passed the Labour Standards Code and, three
16. Red Deer College v. Michaels et al. (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 386 (S.C.C.) per Laskin,
C.J.C. at 400; but see: Hill v. CA. Parsons & Co. Lid, [1972] ch. 305 (Eng. C.A.), per
Denning M. R., where reinstatement was ordered. Laskin C.J.C. distinguished Hill in Red
Deer on the grounds that, in Hill there was a subsisting confidence.
17. Christie, supra,note 6 at 386.
18. Re: Tenant HotlineandPetersand Gitlens (1983), 1 LAC (3d) 130 at 138.
19. Eg. Trade Union Act S.N.S. 1947, c.3.
20. PortArthur Shipbuilding,supra; note 7; Brown and Beatty, supra, note 5 at 349, 362-63,
488-90.
21. See the speech of Hon. Leonard Pace, the Minister of Labour (now Pace, J.A.), Assembly
Debates, February 23, 1972, at 467 where he said:
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years later, brought in s.67A.22 At least some non-union senior workers
would now enjoy the same right not to be dismissed without just cause
enjoyed by their organized counterparts. 23 The mischief to be remedied
was clear: the arbitrary dismissal of senior workers. The threshold of
"seniority" w'-as set, by fiat, at ten yeais. 4
Section 67A (1) contains the substantive right:
Dismissal or Suspension without Just Cause
67A (1) Where an employee's period of employment with an employer
is ten years or more, the employer shall not discharge or suspend that
employee without just cause unless that employee is a person within the
meaning of person as used in clause (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) or (i) of subsection
(3) of Section 68.
The specific provisions of the Code by which an employee may
complain to the Director of Labour Standards and, in turn to the Labour
Standards Tribunal are pointed out in sub-sections 67A (2) and (3):
Complaint to Director
(2) An employee who is discharged or suspended without just cause
may make a complaint to the Director in accordance with Section 19.
Complaint to Tribunal
(3) An employee who has made a complaint under subsection (2) and
who is not satisfied with the result may make a complaint to the Tribunal
in accordance with Section 21 and such complaint shall be and shall be
deemed to be a complaint within the meaning of subsection (1) of Section
21. 1975, c. 50, s. 4; 1976, c. 21, s. 15.
Mr. Speaker, this [Labour Standards Code] sets really, the minimum standards for the
labouring force of Nova Scotia. This is not, of course [,I very relevant to the organized
which [sic] approximates roughly 30 per cent of our labour force. But it is minimum
standards... [this legislation] is necessary for the unprotected and unorganized who have
really no means, or not at least as extensive means as we have [?] to protect themselves from
[sic] minimum working standards which we have set forth in this bill.
Also see the speech of Premier Gerald Regan, Assembly Debates, March 21, 1975 on s.67A.
He goes as far as to characterize the employee's right to the job as a "property right". This
general characterization, which of continuing academic interest, is not, in my view, particularly
helpful in advancing the remedy of reinstatement. Sure, "property rights" are highly regarded
by the courts, but merely to call the employee's interest in the job a "property right" is
conclusionary reasoning that gets us nowhere. Indeed, it obscures the issue for what remedy
ineluctably flows from a "property right"?
22. S.N.S. 1975, c.50.
23. Section 67A was amended the next year by S.N.S. 1976, c.41, s.15 to exclude numerous
classilications of workers from tne protection in s.67A(l), including senior employees who
have been discharged or laid off for "... any reason beyond the control of the employer":
s.68(3)(d); see Christie, supra, note 6 at 376.
24. This was the first legislation of its kind in Canada; but see: Canada Labour Code, R.S.C.
1970, c.L-1, s.61.5, as am. by S.C. 1977-78 c.27, s.21. The federal Code gives the possible
remedy of reinstatement to any employee in the federal sector who has completed 12
consecutive months of continuous employment. The ten year threshold in the provincial Code
is arguably set unreasonably high.
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It must be noted that these sub-sections merely affirm the employee's
right to complain about an alleged violation of s.67A (1). In themselves,
neither of these sub-sections create new rights for employees. The Code
already provided, in s. 19 (1) that the Director may receive a complaint
"in any form" regarding an alleged violation of the Code and, in s. 19 (5)
an employer or employee against whom the Director has made an order
may "appeal" to the Tribunal. In this light, sub-sections 67A (2) and (3)
add nothing to the Code. Moreover, these sub-sections do not purport to
give adjudicatory or remedial powers to either the Director or the
Tribunal. These powers are found elsewhere in the Code; yet, it was these
provisions that the Appeal Division chose to declare ultra vires in Sobeys.
The reference in s.67A (2) to a complaint "in accordance with section
19" merely serves to indicate how an employee is to go about enforcing
s.67A (1) by bringing the matter to the attention of the Director, i.e. "in
any form". Likewise, the reference in s.67A (3) to a complaint "in
accordance with section 21" serves only to tell employees what
procedure to follow should they object to an adverse finding by the
Director. Section 21 requires, for example, that the complaint be put in
writing at that stage in the form prescribed by regulation.
The possible remedy of reinstatement, however, is arrived at by
reading s.67A (1) together with ss. 19 (3) and 24 (2) of the Code.
Sections 19 (3) and 24 (2) empower the Director and the Tribunal,
respectively, to order an employer or employee who is or was in
contravention of the Code (a) "to do any act or thing that ...constitutes
compliance with this act", and both are further empowered to (b) "rectify
any injury caused to the person injured or to make compensation therefor
Quite clearly, and in keeping with the remedial tone of the Code
generally, s. 67A expresses a clear legislative preference for labour over
capital - a preference found in each of the substantive, procedural and
remedial aspects of the provision and one that breaks with the common
law position in an attempt to make the rights and remedies created more
real than illusory.
The preference is exhibited in the substantive provision because it gives
the employee the right not to be dismissed without just cause and
concomitantly limits the employer's common law right to hire and fire at
will.
The procedural provisions of the Code, which taken together provide
the crucial route from right to remedy, also prefer the interests of the
worker over the employer. The procedure thereby established removes
the legal and economic burdens that would otherwise fall on the
complainant-employee taking a private action for wrongful dismissal
and, instead, gives the worker access to the public investigatory/
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adjudicatory apparatus set up by the state under the Code to enforce
prescribed minimum labour standards. Civil litigation is prohibitively
expensive and, hence, inaccessible to many, if not most, individual
working people. Party and party costs recovered in a successful action
amount to anly a small fvaction of tht actual costs of litigating a claim.
This plays into the hands of the employer who, by and large, has vastly
superior economic power. This statutory procedure puts a thumb on the
scale of justice to the extent that it at least gives an employee a chance to
make a claim.
A complaint under the code automatically triggers an investigation by
a Labour Standards Officer.25 After the investigation, the officer will
attempt to mediate and effect a settlement of the matter.26 Failing a
settlement (or in default of one) the Director may (as was done in Mr.
Yeoman's case) make an order as described above. It is only when the
party adversely affected by the Director's order (i.e. the employer under
s.67A) wishes to take the matter further and have a full hearing on the
facts that the case goes to the Tribunal. In this event, it is the Director,
and not the worker who is specifically charged with carriage of the matter
against the employer before the Tribunal.2 7 It is tempting to say that the
Director, in such a case, "steps into the employee's shoes" for the
purposes of the hearing but this would be a less than accurate
characterization. The complainant is not actually subrogated in any way
and is given standing as a party before the Tribunal. 28 The procedure is
better understood as one in which a public official, having conducted an
independent investigation, has concluded that there has been a violation
of the minimum labour standards laws and is under a statutory duty to
enforce the right of workers under the Code. The point is that the
complainant need to do nothing to further the matter after making the
complaint. The l/s, very clearly, at this stage is between the Director and
the employer. Of course the matter is initiated by the employee's
complaint, but how else is this public official to learn of alleged violations
of the Code in the first place?
It should be clear that the Tribunal does not sit as an "appeal" tribunal
on matters of law alone.29 It hears the evidence like a court of first
25. Code,s.19(l).
26. Code, s.19(2).
27. Code, s.20(a). Should the Director decline to find a violation of the Code in favour of the
employee, that employee has the right, under s.21, to take the matter to the Tribunal. In such
a case it is the employee who has carriage of the matter and the Director is usually not a party.
This is an extension of the preference in favour of the employee who, unlike the employer in
the reverse situation, does not have to take on the Director himself before the Tribunal.
28. Code, s.20(c).
29. The proceeding is referred to in the Code, s.19(5), as an "appeal" but this is surely not
strict legal usage. Cf.A. G. of Quebecv.Farrah(1978), 86 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (S.C.C.).
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instance and, like virtually all such administrative tribunals, acting in the
interests of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, combines its expertise in
30
employment relations with relaxed rules of evidence and procedure.
By the same token, the remedy of reinstatement itself expresses a
preference for labour over capital. In opening the door to reinstatement,
the legislature is quite clearly resolving the common-law hangups about
mutuality, enforceability and "subsisting confidence" in favour of the
worker.
It must be emphasized that it was neither the right nor the remedy per
se that was under direct attack in Sobeys: both are valid aspects of
provincial legislation. 31 The sole issue was the vires of the procedural
scheme under the Code in light of s.96.
The upshot of the cases decided under s.96 of the Constitution Act,
1867 is clear enough: as a rule, and with only limited possible
exceptions, 32 the provinces cannot confer judicial power on inferior
courts or tribunals that either directly or by analogy were exercised by a
superior court in 1867.
Clearly, the first step in any analysis of the vires of legislation under
s.96 is to identify with precision the source of the impugned judicial
power. Yet, in the result, this crucial, if not plainly obvious, step seems to
have eluded the Appeal Division in this case. Mr. Justice Hart, writing
for the five-member Court, certainly discusses the adjudacatory and
remedial functions of the Director and Tribunal with some distain, but
only in obiter,for the Court ends up by expressly declaring that it is the
specific provisions that point out the procedures by which a senior
worker can complain about dismissal without cause as set out in 67A (2)
and (3) that are offensive to s.96. Inadvertantly, I am sure, the Court
failed to pass express judgement on the powers of the Director and the
Tribunal, found elsewhere in the Code, to entertain and decide on
complaints made under s.67A (1) and grant remedies, including
reinstatement.
Accordingly, it seems to me that Sobeys leaves untouched:
(a) the substantive right of 10 year employees not to be dismissed
without just cause [s.67A(1)];

30. Code, s.15(8). The Tribunal is a three-person body. Although the Code does not
specifically require it, by convention and practice it is made up of a neutral chairperson who
is invariably a member of the bar and one member from each management and labour. Thus,
it is as close as we are likely to come to a truly "expert" tribunal in these matters.

31. ConstitutionAct, 1867, s.92(13) and (16). Hart J. A., while formally recognizing this legal
fact, obliquely expresses some doubt as to whether the courts would acknowledge the right or
the remedy. See Infra, note 58.
32. Infra, note 37.
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(b) the general right of workers to complain about violations of the
Code, including s.67A(1) [s. 19(1)];
(c) the power of the Director to receive such complaints, to investigate
matters arising out of such complaints and to attempt to effect a
settlement theeof [s.19(l) and (2)1;
(d) the power of the Director to decide whether there has been a
violation of the Code [s.19(2) and (3)];
(e) the power of the Director to order compliance with the Code and to
grant remedies for non-compliance [s.19(3)];
(f) the right of the party adversely affected by an order of the Director
to take the matter before the Tribunal [s. 19(5)];
(g) the power of the Tribunal to hear such matters and decide whether
the Code has been violated [ss.21, 24(2)];
(h) the power of the Tribunal to order compliance with the Code and to
grant remedies for non-compliance [s.24(2)].
Obviously, this is not the view of the case taken by the Attorney
General of Nova Scotia who has launched an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada, nor of the Nova Scotia Department of Labour who
have stopped taking complaints made under s.67A altogether pending the
outcome of the appeal. Just as obviously, it was not what the Appeal
Division intended to do in holding s.67A(2) and (3) ultra vires. But,
inexplicably perhaps, it is what the Court seems to have done.
With this background, and accepting, for the sake of discussion, that
the holding in this case does indeed somehow declare the powers I have
identified above as (d), (e), (g) and (h) ultra vires the province, we can
move now to some of the broader issues arising from the case as decided.
II.
In the leading contemporary case on s.96, the reference Re Residential
Tenancies Act (Ontario),33 Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was)
observed that the judicature sections of the British North America Act,
186734 represented "one of the important historical compromises of the
Fathers of Confederation". 35 The provinces would continue to design and
control the make-up of the provincial judicature, while the Dominion
authority would appoint, pay and remove the judges as selected from the
bars of the respective provinces. 36
33. (1981),37 N. R. 158.
34. ss. 96-101.
35. Supra, note 33 at 170.
36. Curiously, the selection of the judges from the respective provincial bars of the original
common law provinces is to continue "until the laws relative to Property and Civil Rights...
are made uniform": s.97. Interesting though the idea may be, cross-provincial appointments to
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It remains unclear just how much of a "compromise" this arrangement
was or, indeed, how "important" (if at all) it really was to the framers of
the BNA Act All of the Fathers of Confederation were, after all,
representing their respective provinces. There was no Dominion
government yet to fight with and, unless we are prepared to endow them
with remarkable prescience, we must assume that they could not have
foreseen the development of administrative law as a major tool of
modem government, much less the judicial interpretation of s.96, in
particular, that was to follow.
From Nova Scotia's point of view, at least, this "compromise" must
have seemed a pretty good deal. The colony gave up little and gained a
lot. Nova Scotia would continue to control the design of the court
structure but judicial appointments made historically by the Colonial
Secretary in London (latterly from the provincial bar) would now be
made by the new Dominion government in Ottawa. As a clear bonus, the
Dominion authority would thenceforth pay the judges' salaries - a small
matter from today's perspective but, for the colony of Nova Scotia it
would eliminate what, by 1841, had become an unconscionable drain on
the tiny provincial treasury and a major source of public scandal.
England, it was shown had a population of 12,000,000 and twelve judges;
Nova Scotia a population of 124,000 and nine judges. Even worse, the
Chief Justice of Nova Scotia was receiving a larger salary than the Chief
of Nova Scotia
Justice of the United States and the judicial establishment
37
was costing more than that of the State of New York.
This situation led to the abolition of the (civil) Inferior Courts of
Common Pleas and the (criminal) Courts of Quarter Session in 1841,
leaving no body performing judicial functions in the colony between the
Supreme Court and two justices of the peace acting in concert with a
monetary jurisdiction limited, eventually, to $80.
Appointment of judges from the small, elite Nova Scotia bar nicely
maintained the status quo and removal of the judges on joint address of
Parliament by the Governor-General was a dream come true.
For years the Assembly strove to make the puisne judges removeable by
a joint address of the Council and the Assembly and, as a bargaining point
[with the Colonial Secretary], it declined to place their salaries on a
permanent basis ... In the end, however it had to confess failure, for
although it added a face-saving provision when it made salaries permanent
in effect to be at the pleasure
[in 1848], the tenure of the justices continued,
38
of the Secretary of State [for the Colonies].
the bench remain as politically untenable today as they must have been in 1867. Every bit as
untenable as the suggestion that the provinces should have uniform laws under s.91(13).
37. Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia (1957), at 128.
38. Id at 71-2.
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Nevertheless, and despite these mundane practicalities, judges and
scholars alike have displayed piercing hindsight, if not outright historical
revisionism, in ascribing all kinds of lofty purposes to ss. 96-101. The
Privy Council rather extravagantly refers to them as "the principal pillars
in the temple of justice' 39 and, in -what has become the conventional
view, described their purpose as reinforcing judicial independence. 40 The
assumption being that federal appointment, pay and removal would
insulate the judges from local pressure. Dr. Morris Schumiatcher seemed
to suggest in a 1949 article that these sections are the Canadian
equivalent of the "due process clause" of the American Bill of Rights but surely he was thinking more of the effect of these sections and their
apparently unlimited scope for judicial review than anything intended by
the framers to be their purpose.4' More recently, Dickson J. said the
purpose was to ensure "a strong constitutional base for national unity,
through a unitary judiciary". 42 One cannot help but comment that the
sins committed in this country under the etherial rubric of "national
unity" are legion. And Professor Hogg finds the rationale in the fact that
the s.96 courts are courts of general jurisdiction, applying both federal
and provincial laws - although he is the first to point out that this
justification loses force the more the federal Parliament uses its powers
under s.101 to create federal courts and tribunals to decide issues under
43
federal law, as it has been increasingly doing since Confederation.
There may be some value in some or all of these disparate rationales,
but three things are abundantly clear from the cases: (a) the provinces
cannot do by the back door what they cannot do from the front: statutes
vesting judicial power on any body that the s.96 courts view as their own
will be construed as an offence against s.96 and will not be permitted to
stand, (b) the courts have been unable or unwilling to deliniate in any
meaningful way the judicial powers peculiar to s.96 court as distinct from
any other adjudicatory functions and, (c) the bottom line is that the s.96
39. Toronto v. York, [1938] A. C. 415 at 426.
40. Toronto v. York, Id; also see Martineau & Sons v. Montreal [1932] A. C. 113 at 120;
Lederman, (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 769 and 1139, 1158-79. Professor Lederman points to the
provisions of the 1848 act of the Assembly in Nova Scotia (11 Vict., c.21) as evidencing an
early concern for judicial independence in Nova Scotia. But as Professor Beck notes, in passing
this bill "the lower house appears to have been more concerned with making the judges
dependent upon itself than with strengthing their independence [from the crown]". This was
the "face-saving provision" regarding removal of puisne judges alluded to earlier. And
Professor Hogg finds the whole rationale of reinforcing judicial independence "not very
convincing": Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,(1985), at 136.
41. Schumiatcher, (1949), 27 Can. Bar Rev. 131. The matter of the scope provided for judicial
review and its comparison to the dreaded 'Lochnerera' in the U.S. will be taken up infra, note
68.
42. Supra, note 33 at 170.
43. Hogg, supra,note40 at 136 n. 19.
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courts have virtually unfettered discretion to define and protect the limits
of their own jurisdiction by erecting constitutional barriers against
intrusive, but otherwise quite valid, provincial legislation.
One might legitimately expect, therefore, that judges deciding cases
under this head of constitutional review would be most anxious to foster
- and be seen to foster - an appropriate balance between protecting
the integrity of the constitutional provisions providing for their own
appointment pay and removal, on the one hand, and the legitimate
preferences of a democratically elected legislature, on the other.
Accordingly, the reasons for judgement in such a case could be expected
to be as purposive and sophisticated as the task is demanding.
Unfortunately, the judgement delivered in Sobeys falls far short of this
expectation. The constitutional purpose of the exercise, if indeed there is
one, did not seem to matter in the least to Hart J. A. for there is not a
single word of teleological analysis in the judgement. One can only
speculate on the constitutional ends the Court was seeking to secure by
deciding this case solely on the s.96 question. Perhaps His Lordship was
of the view that the purpose of the exercise is too well-settled or,
alternatively, too obscure to admit further elaboration with reference to
the facts of the instant case. Instead, however, the first part of the
judgement consists of a mechanical, even pro forma, "historical
overview", citing the same cases and repeating the same conclusions that
Mr. Justice Dickson had done in arriving at the now-famous "test" in the
Ontario Residential Tenancies reference. This "exhaustive test" (to use
Mr. Justice Hart's term), as relied on by the Court in Sobeys, was
summarized by Laskin C. J. C. in another case decided by the Supreme
44
Court of Canada in the same year.
1. Does the challenged power or jurisdiction broadly conform to the
power or jurisdiction exercised by Superior, District or County
Courts at the time of donfederation?
2. Is the function of the provincial tribunal within its institutional setting
a judicial function, considered from the point of view of the nature of
the question which the tribunal is called upon to decide or, to put it
in other words, is the tribunal concerned with a private dispute which
it is called upon to adjudicate through the application of a recognized
body of rules and in a manner consistent with fairness and
impartiality?
3. If the power or jurisdiction is exercised in a judicial manner, does its
function as a whole and in its entire institutional context violate s.96?
In reality, this is not a "test" at all. As Professor Hogg points out, "the
three step approach now favoured by the Supreme Court of Canada is no
44. Massey-Ferguson Industries Limited et aL v. Government of Saskatchewan (1981), 39
N. R. 308 at 324.
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doubt a sound synthesis of the prior case law ... [blut it is not a
satisfactory constitutional-law doctrine.". 45 The three "steps" are vague
and circular and, I suggest, can be relied on in any result.
The "test" can be more accurately characterized as embodying a
simple rule, one example of a type of case falling outside the rule and one
deceptively narrow exception to the rule. The rule, as stated above, is that
provincial legislation granting judicial power to an inferior court or
tribunal analogous to that exercised by a superior court in 1867 is ultra
vires. The "second step" is clearly subsumed within the rule and is merely
an elaboration on a type of case failing outside of it. For, if the power in
question is other than a 'Judicial power", the rule simply does not
apply.4 6 The exception, which might seem on its face to be much broader
than it is in practice, is to the effect that the courts may be prepared to
allow the endowment of certain s.96 judicial functions to be exercised "as
a part of a broader policy scheme" 47 under provincial legislation. For all
practical purposes, however, this exception has been limited in
application to statutory bodies regulating collective agreements4" or
where the tribunal has some other clearly specified and non-judicial
administrative or rule-making function, 49 but this other function cannot
be seen as merely incidental to the inpugned judicial function.50 The
judicial concession to social progress and democracy is, thus, more
apparent in the exception than real.
Mr. Justice Hart begins his application of the rule by dismissing the
inconvenient fact that the rule seems only to apply to judicial power that
was actually exercised by a superior court over 118 years ago. By finding
as a matter of law that the rule applies to all powers which, while never
actually exercised, were at least theoreticallyexercisable by analogy, he is
able to come to the conclusion that there is "no doubt" that the power to
award reinstatement was "traditionally vested in the Supreme Court of
Nova Scotia at the time of Confederation". 5' His Lordship put the matter
this way:5 2
It is argued that since the superior courts chose to exercise their discretion
against ordering reinstatement in wrongful dismissal cases and confined
45. Hogg, supra, note 40 at 161.

46. See Massey-Ferguson,supra, note 44; CapitalRegionalDistrict v. Concerned Citizens of
B.C, [198212 S.C.R. 842.
47. Supra; note 33 at 173.
48. See Tomko v. Labour Relations Board of Nova Scotia (1975), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 250
(S.C.C.).
49. Mississauga v. Pee [1979] 2 S.C.R. 244; Massey-Ferguson,supra, note 44; CapitalReg.
Dist, supra, note 46.
50. Re: Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario),supra, note 33.
51. Sobeys, supra, note I at 398-9.
52. Id at 399.
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the remedy to an award of damages based upon notice reasonably
required for the termination of the contract of employment, that the s.96
Courts had not exercised this equitable jurisdiction. I cannot agree with
this proposition, since the failure to grant a remedy available to the Court
because of its deemed inappropriateness at a particular time is not an
abdication of that jurisdiction but simply a suspension of it for the time
being. The power to grant reinstatement under a contract of employment
has always rested with the Supreme Court and did so at the time of
Confederation.
No authority is cited for the proposition that the reach of the test for
vires under s.96 extends to powers only theoretically and potentially
exercisable by superior courts in 1867. Moreover, this particular
extension of the rule ignores the fact that the remedy of reinstatement was
(and is) unavailable, not "because of its deemed inappropriateness at a
particular time", but rather because there is no judicially cognizable right
to reinstatement, at common law or in equity, on which the remedy
could be founded. Indeed, the courts have repeatedly said that the
remedy is inequitable.5 3 It was precisely because the judges refused to
recognize such a right and give a suitable remedy that the Legislature of
the Province was moved to create it.
In any event, this finding highlights the absurdity of the rule itself.
History shows that the judicature of the colony of Nova Scotia was quite
unsatisfactory and badly in need of reform at the time of Confederation.5 4
Far from being the result of a carefully crafted design suitable to the needs
and desires of the people of the colony, the structure of the courts, with
plenary powers vested in a single court, was the result of a peculiar mix
of economic and political factors, some of which have already been
mentioned, that occurred well before Confederation and had nothing
whatsoever to do with an intended separation of powers or consciously
designed limitations on the powers of the provincial Legislature under the
B.N.A. Act. The important fact is, and it is one that is blithely ignored by
the courts in their haste to over-rule provincial laws under s.96, that by
the reforms of 1841 which abolished the lower courts, every analogy to
the British system of superior and inferior courts on which the judicial
analysis of s.96 is based was destroyed in Nova Scotia.
Indeed, the very reason that the reforms of 1841 were so long in
coming, despite wide-spread consensus that change was desperately
needed, was precisely that the political parties, the Reformers and the
Conservatives in turn, each opposed the changes on the basis that the
British analogy would thereby be destroyed. Essentially there were two
choices at the time: reduce the number ofjudges in each court or transfer
53. Supra, note 13.
54. See Beck, supra,note 37 at 128 ff.
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all judicial functions (above the j.p.'s) to the Supreme Court. When the
Legislature opted for the latter course in 1841 it can be safely said that
there was not a politician in the colony who was unaware that the British
analogy was dissolved. 5 To revive it now, 118 years later, for the
purposes of striking down laws passed by the Legislature is an antihistorical non-sequitur.To extend the analogy, by further analogy, to vest
exclusive constitutional power in the Supreme Court to grant remedies
totally unknown in law in 1841 or 1867just adds insult to the injury.
The inadequacy of the rule itself as a constitutional doctrine is all the
more apparent in that it is applied ad hoc on a province-by-province
basis. By sheer historical accident, some provinces seem to have been able
or willing to adhere more closely to the British analogy and, accordingly,
seem to have devolved more power on inferior courts and tribunals. This
has led, of course, to the courts declaring the laws of some provinces intra
vires, while almost identical laws in others have been found
56
unconstitutional.
Having satisfied himself that the inpugned power was prima facie
within the rule, Mr. Justice Hart then moved on, as precedent dictates, to
discover whether or not a closer look at the "judicial" aspect of the power
would confirm that conclusion. It did. His Lordship discusses the
question in a single paragraph:
I can see no reason for reaching the conclusion that there is any change in
the judicial nature of the powers vested in the tribunal when looking at it
in its institutional setting. It may very well be that the tribunal when
making orders to remedy breaches of minimum wages under the Act and
others [sicl of its provisions is in reality simply carrying out an
administrative function necessary to obtain the objects of the legislation,
but when dealing with s.67A, which is in reality an amendment to the
common law relating to contracts of employment and in considering
whether "just cause" exists or not, the tribunal can only be performing a
judicial function...
This neatly avoids the central issue as posed by Mr. Justice Dickson in
the Tenancies Reference case, and duly quoted by Hart JA earlier in the
55. Id
56. The recent cases dealing with rent review boards and residential tenancies tribunals are a
good example of this. In the Ontario Residential Tenancies Act reference, supra, note 33, the
Supreme Court of Canada found that the powers of Ontario's tribunal to make eviction orders
and order parties to comply with rent control legislation were ultra vires in that these were
powers analogous to those of Ontario superior Courts in 1867, but in A. G. of Quebec v.
Grodin, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364, the Court found that similar power had been exercised by inferior
courts and, hence, Quebec's law is intra vires. See also: Burke v. Arab (1981), 49 N.S.R. (2d)
181, (C.A.), Re Fort Massey Realties (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 51, Re Proposed Legislation
ConcerningLeased Premises(1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 460 (Alta. C.A.), Re Pepita andDoukas
(1982) D.L.R. (3d) 577 (B.C.C.A.).
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judgement, namely: Is the tribunal dealing with a matter that is essentially
a "private dispute between parties"? As Mr. Justice Dickson put it, "the
hallmark of a judicial power is a lis between parties" in which the
tribunal "deals primarily with the rights of the parties to the dispute,
rather than considerations of the collective good of the community as a
57
whole".
Surely, it is at least arguable that, with the way the Code is set up, with
the Director having carriage of the matter before the Tribunal - having
made an order after and independent inquiry that it is not a "private
dispute" at all. The Director, in these cases, is no mere surrogate for the
complainant-employee, he is the public official designated to uphold the
"collective good of the community as a whole" as manifest in the Labour
Standards Code. The ultimate goal, for both the Director and the
Tribunal, is the enforcement of the Code. Certainly, this will involve an
assessment on a case-by-case basis of whether the Code has, in fact, been
violated, but how else can the Code be enforced? The finding that an
employee was or was not dismissed "without just cause" is just a
necessary but incidental step to that enforcement. Likewise, the remedy
of reinstatement, which merely puts the employer and employee back in
the place where they would have been had there been no violation is
similarly a necessary incident to the enforcement of the Code. This
argument is all the more potent, it seems to me, precisely because the
Code breaks with the common law in setting a new standard for the
conduct of employment relations.
Unfortunately, this consideration of the impugned '"udicial power",
while adverted to, seems to go by the wayside in the actual judgement.
Instead, His Lordship concludes the paragraph just quoted with the
8
following, rather revealing, remark:
It is the type of dispute between parties that traditionally falls for
resolution to the superior courts, and although these courts now may have
to considerthe remedy of reinstatement as an alternative to damages it is
for them to do so and not a provincially appointedtribunal
[emphasis added]
First, I would have thought that, in light of s.67A(1) which is
admittedly valid provincial law, the courts would have to do more than
merely "consider the remedy of reinstatement as an alternative to
damages". This seems to contradict Mr. Justice Harts earlier statement to
the effect that the courts have always considered - but, it just so
happens, invariably rejected - the remedy of reinstatement. Perhaps His
57. Residential Tenancies,supra, note 33 at 182.
58. Sobeys, supra, note 1.
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Lordship means that, in light of s.67A(1), the courts might now be forced
however reluctantly, to apply the remedy. But, more importantly, this
statement seems to underscore the confusion in the Court's mind between
its traditional abhorance of the remedy itself and the validity of the
powers conferred on the Tribunal to grant the remedy. For, surely, the
availability of any particular remedy does not go to the question of
whether or not the issue to be decided is purely a private dispute between
the parties. Remedies of one sort or another are frequently granted where
the main issue in a case turns on a determination of "the collective good
of the community as a whole".5 9 By the same token, the mere fact that the
remedy bears some analogy to one that might have been granted by a
superior court does not ineluctably turn the adjudicatory function of the
tribunal into a "judicial power". 60
But having brought the function of the Tribunal in this case within the
rule by this judicial alchemy, Mr. Justice Hart then purports to apply the
"third step" in an effort to determine whether the impugned judicial
function falls into the narrow exception for judicial powers exercised "as
part of a broader social policy scheme". 61 Mr. Justice Hart62duly quotes
the words of Dickson J. setting out the task to be performed:
It is no longer sufficient simply to examine the particular power or
function of a tribunal and ask whether this power or function was once
performed by s.96 courts. This would be examining the power or function,
in a 'detached manner', contrary to the reasoning in Tomko. What must be
considered is the 'context' in which the power is exercised. Tomko leads to
the following result: it is possible for administrative tribunals to exercise
powers and jurisdiction which were once exercised by the s.96 courts. It
will all depend on the context of the exercise of the power. It may well be
that the impugned judicial powers' are merely subsidiary or ancilliary to
general administrative functions assigned to the tribunal (John East;
Tomko) or the powers may be necessarily incidental to the achievement of
a broader policy goal of the legislature (Mississauga).
...

Very clearly, this would seem to require the court to engage in an
analysis of the context of the exercise of the Tribunal's functions and the
policy goals of the Labour Standards Code. The most frustrating thing
about the judgement in Sobeys is that the Appeal Division would
59. See Massey-Ferguson, supra, note 44 where the Supreme Court of Cnada upheld the
power of provincially-appointed compensation board to grant the "remedy" of compensation
on the grounds, inter alia, of absence of a private dispute between the parties.
60. This was the holding, relative to the power of the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board
to order reinstatement of workers dismissed on grounds that amounted to unfair labour
practices, in Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works, [19481 4
D.L.R. 673 (P.C.), from which Dickson J. derived the "second step" of the test.
61. Supra, note 47.
62. Residential Tenancies,supra,note 33 at 176, Sobeys, supra, note, 1 at 398.
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mechanically recite the precedent requiring such an analysis and, while
baldly claiming to follow it, would so transparently fail or refuse to
engage in the required exegesis. Not a single word is said in the
judgement about the context of the exercise of the "judicial powers" by
the Tribunal. At no time is the procedure whereby a matter comes before
the Tribunal mentioned. There is no attempt to examine the inpugned
power, in relation to other functions performed by the Tribunal. No
serious attempt is made to square the view of the Court of the function
of the Tribunal with the labour relations cases (John East and Tomko) in
which the courts held the inpugned "judicial powers" to be merely
incidental to the more general function of securing "industrial peace" in
light of new measures designed to provide for the greater protection of
workers through collective bargaining. No attempt whatsoever is made to
analyse or understand the social policy goals behind the Labour
Standards Code and place the Tribunal's rule under s.67A in that context.
Instead, under the guise of applying Mr. Justice Dickson's "third step",
Mr. Justice Hart distills another question altogether from thin air. The
question His Lordship poses to himself is whether it is "necessary" that
the matter be adjudicated upon by a s.96 court as opposed, presumably,
to it being "necessary" that it be decided by a provincial tribunal. By
posing this question, His Lordship is apparently content to dismiss as
irrelevant the questions raised by Mr. Justice Dickson. Moreover, the
"reasons" Hart J. A. gives for his conclusion that it is indeed "necessary"
that a s.96 court deal with these matters exclusively are profoundly
cryptic. His Lordship says: 63
As I mentioned earlier, the obvious intention of the Legislature in passing
s.67A was to grant security of tenure to employees of more than ten years
standing. This alteration of the common law can well be applied in the
superior and county courts [sic] of the province.
In my opinion it is completely unnecessary to pass the question of
whether or not an employee has been unjustly dismissed to a provincial
tribunal. The question is simply a matter of a dispute between two parties
to a contract of employment and is not a matter ancilliary to the broad
social purpose of obtaining industrial peace as held in the Labour
RelationsBoardcases. Section 67A is simply one piece ofsociallegislation
which was coupled together with a group of others relating to labour
standards. There is, in my opinion, no valid need to have the
determination of such disputes resolved by the Labour Standards Tribunal.
When one looks at the type of issues considered by the Board [sic] in
attempting to make their determination, it is apparent that the resolution
ofsuch a problem requiresthe ingenuity and inherentpowers ofa common
law court The legislation raises the very issues attempted to be faced by
the Board [sic], that is to say, the determination of the true meaning of
63. Sobeys, Id at 400.
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'just cause" in an employment contract and whether arbitral decisions
relating to this subject based on collective agreements should be utilized in
the determination of that meaning. Courts may decide that the traditional
common law meaning of 'just cause" can no longer remain now that all
[sic] members of the work force have been given a certain amount of
security of tenure commonly only available to those protected by

collective agreements. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to consider the
nature of the remedy to be granted for a breach of contract, including the
possibility of an award of damages and/or reinstatement. The principles
upon which such a remedy should be granted should be developed by the

courts unless clearly specified by legislation. This is not a task that should
ordinarilybe left to an administrativetribunaL
[emphasis added]
Taking this view to its logical conclusion, it would, of course, never be
strictly "necessary" to have administrative tribunals so long as the s.96
courts exist. The courts are capable, theoretically at least, of deciding any
type of case. The point, however, is that, while it may not be strictly
speaking, "necessary" to give certain functions to tribunals it may very
well be desireableas a matter of public policy to do so. That is, there may
well be valid policy reasons why the Legislature decided, as in the case
of labour relations boards (Tomko) or the Ontario Municipal Board
(Missassauga), to vest these functions in bodies composed of persons
possessed of qualifications other than those germane to an appointment
under s.96. Professor Hogg has summarized some of these considerations
as follows:64
The novel tasks of adjudication which entailed new schemes of regulation
have commonly been entrusted to administrative tribunals rather than to
courts. Some of the reasons for this preference can be identified. First is the
desire for a specialist body; specially qualified personnel can be appointed
to a tribunal, and those who do not start off specially qualified can acquire
experience and expertise in the field of regulation (whether it be labour
relations, marketing of agricultural products, transportation, broadcasting,
liquor licensing, or whatever). Second is the desire for innovation: a
tribunal can be given broad discretion to develop the policies and remedies
required to implement a new scheme of regulation (such as foreign
investment review, control of pay television). Third is the desire for
initiative: a tribunal (such as a human rights commission or a securities
commission) can be given power to initiate proceedings, undertake
investigations, to do research and to play an educative and policyformulating role as well as an adjudicative one. Fourth is the problem of
volume: if adjudication is required with great frequency (as in worker's
compensation, unemployment insurance, immigration, income tax
objections, for example), the tribunal can develop procedures to handle a
case load that would choke the ordinary court system. Fifth is economy:
64. Hogg, supra, note 40 at 155-6.
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a tribunal can be structured and mandated to be less formal, speedier and
less expensive than the ordinary courts...
In my view, each of these five factors apply in the case of the Labour
Standards Tribunal and the Director of Labour Standards. By failing to
even consider the issue, the Appeal Division seems to be making the
novel and (rather startling) statement that it is never desireable that
matters be decided upon by (mere) tribunal in preference to (real) courts,
unless a court decides, for some reason, that it is "necessary" in the sense
that the subject-matter is trivial enough not to require the alleged
"ingenuity and inherent power of a common law court". Mysteriously,
this new rule would seem to apply afortioriwhere the courts have been
content to demonstrate their "ingenuity and inherent powers" by refusing
to grant a remedy desired by the Legislature.
This proposition flies in the face of stance taken, in obiter,by the Privy
65
Council in John East.
This matter [of vires] may be tested in another way. If the appellant
[labour relations] Board is a Court analogous to the Superior and other
Courts mentioned in s.96 of the B.NA. Act, its members must not only be
appointed by the Governor-General but must be chosen from the Bar of
Saskatchewan. It islegitimate therefore to ask whether, if trade unions had
in 1867 been recognized by the law if collective bargaining had been the
accepted postulate of inductrial peace, if, in a word, the economic and
social outlook had been the same in 1867 as it became in 1944, it would
not have been expedient to establish just such a specialized tribunal as is
provided by s.4 of the Act. It is as good a test as another of "analogy" to
ask whether the subject-matter of the assumed justiciable issue makes it
desireable that Judges should have the same qualifications as those which
distinguish the Judges of Superior or other Courts. And it appears to their
Lordships that to this question only one answer can be given. For wide
experience has shown that... it is essential that its ... members should

bring an experience and knowledge acquired extra-judicially to the
solution of their problems.
In the same way it could be argued - if the question were entertained
by the Court - that, if the "economic and social outlook" in matters of
employment law generally and in regard to remedies for dismissal
without just cause in particular, were in 1867 what they were in 1972 or
1975, it would have been seen as desireable to have these very matters
decided by persons other than judges of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court.
Very likely, I suggest, it would. Not "necessary", perhaps, but desireable
nonetheless.
But no where in the cases do we find authority for the proposition,
apparently relied on in Sobeys, that certain matters are just too serious
65. John East,supra,note 59 at 681-2.
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and too complex (like determining a standard for "just cause") to be "left
to an administrative tribunal". As mentioned, the arbitrators, deciding
questions under collective agreements, have done quite well in this
regard. What, it may be fairly asked, is the real and essential difference
between deciding the issue of "just cause" under a statutory minimum
standards scheme on the one hand, and making the same decision
pursuant to a similar clause in a collective agreement? What is it about
the former that seems to necessitate the special insights and expertise of
a s.96 court that are absent in the latter case? And, even if there is a
difference, given that the Court is prepared to acknowledge that it is the
intention of the Legislature to give a protection to workers not covered
by collective agreements that is enjoyed by their unionized counterparts,
why would it be suggested that the courts might appropriately employ a
different standard for "just cause"? We look in vain for answers to these
questions in this judgement.
In any event, the Court's rather extravagant concern that a mere
tribunal might not be quite capable of making these important decisions
overlooks the fact that an appeal lies from the Tribunal to the Appeal
Division, directly, on any question of law.66 Presumably, that Court
would be duty bound to exercise supervisory jurisdiction to correct errors
of the Tribunal should it show itself incapable or unworthy of this
awesome responsibility.
In the result, the judgement in Sobeys would seem to stand for the
following constitutional law proposition: all that is required to defeat
provincial legislation under s.96 is to show that the impugned function
was, by some analogy, one that might have provided a remedy that might
have been given by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in 1867, even
where the remedy and the right to it were totally unknown in law, unless
the court finds that the matter is so trivial as to make it unnecessary that
it be decided by a "real" judge.
Accordingly, the Appeal Division unanimously found that "the
provisions of the Labour Standards Code, which vest in the Labour
Standards tribunal the right [sic] to determine whether a particular
employee has or has not been dismissed for 'just cause' and to further
determine a sanction which should be imposed upon any employer as a
result of breach of s.67A of the Act, are. . ." ultra vires the Legislature.
III.
Despite the apparently broad reach of that finding, the Court went on to
make an order67 that only specifically declares "that s.67A(2) and (3) of
66. See supra, note 8.
67. Order dated October 29, 1985, per Clarke, C.J.N.S.; Prothonotary's file S.C.A. No.
01430.

238 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the Labour Standards Code ... are ultra vires the Province of Nova
Scotia". For the reasons already explained, this declaration falls far short
of ruling the specific judicial and remedial powers of the Director and the
Tribunal unconstitutional, nor, as strictly read, does it alter or limit in any
way the access that fired senior employees would have to redress under
the Code via the Director and Tribunal. And, interestingly, the question
that the Attorney General of Nova Scotia apparently intends to put
before the Supreme Court of Canada is simply: "Are s.67A(2) and (3) of
the Labour Standards Code, SNS 1972, c.10 ultra vires the Province of
Nova Scotia? ''68 If my view that these sub-sections do not themselves
bestow adjudicative power on the Tribunal is accepted, posing the
question in this narrow way might result in a very brief and narrow
finding to the effect that these sub-sections cannot offend s.96. And, while
this may accomplish the immediate result of over-turning the Order of
the Appeal Division and its specific declaration, it would not, of course,
result in the much broader re-examination of the s.96 problem that the
judgement of the Appeal Division in this case begs.
I question the historical basis for the application of s.96 as a
constitutional doctrine - especially as it relates to Nova Scotia. I suggest
that any judicial overruling of laws passed by a democratically elected
legislature must be purposive and that purpose must be subject to
constant review especially by the courts, who must be prepared, each
time it is invoked, to justify the purpose of the exercise in rational and
contemporary terms. It is simply not good constitutional law-making, or
appropriate judicial behavior, to engage in an avowedly mechanical
exercise of judicial formalism the upshot of which is to strike down
provincial statutes by saying 'Hands off our jurisdiction, you chaps'.
The judgement in Sobeys v. Yeomans is a case in point, made all the
more disturbing because it represents the use by the Court of the s.96
exercise to thwart an important social reform and to turn the clock back
by asserting a judge-made right to pass judgement on provincial laws. It
is not difficult to see that part and parcel of this social reform designed to
improve and protect the rights of workers is a clear and unequivocal
legislative preference for the interests of labour over capital. And it does
not take much reading between the lines in a case like Sobeys to see that
the "offense" that concerned the Court was precisely this substantive,
procedural and remedial preference. For it is a preference antithetical to
the interests with which that Court, historically at least, is most
associated.
68. The Notice of Appeal filed in the Supreme Court of Canada by the Attorney General of
Nova Scotia (dated March 19, 1986) reveals no grounds for appeal. Leave to appeal was
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Sobeys represents a species of 'judicial activism' reminiscent of the
infamous 'Lochner era' in the U.S.,69 when the American courts struck
down state laws designed to reform employment law by providing for
minimum hours of work and wages and limiting anti-union activities by
employers on the grounds that these reforms violated the employers
rights to 'substantive due process'. But as Mr. Justice Holmes was quick
to point out in his famous dissent in Lochner, the Court was merely
substituting its preference, under the guise of constitutional review, for
laissez-faire economics that had been deliberately rejected by the
Legislature. His statement then, in 1905, is strikingly relevant today. 70
Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges are
likely to share. Some may not. But a Constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez-faire.It is made for
people of fundamentally different views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel and even shocking ought
not to conclude our judgement upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
To the extent, then, that our law in relation to s.96 is so vague and
unpredictable and susceptible of grave abuse, we must question the very
propriety of this head of constitutional review. It is curious indeed that
our courts would be uncharacteristically activist and seemingly prepared
to throw all judicial restraint to the breeze when the matter at issue is
their own jurisdiction versus that of the Legislature.
Far from clarifying the law or furthering in any practical way the cause
of judicial restraint in these matters, the Supreme Court of Canada, from
the Residential Tenancies case on, has sufficiently muddied the waters as
to unleash a torrent of expensive and unpredictable litigation. That Court
will now have an excellent opportunity in Sobeys to rethink the matter
entirely with a view to eliminating once and for all some of the sacred
cows that surround s.96. It must be acknowledged that the existing "test"
if that, indeed, is what it is - has been a failure. A much more
practical alternative, but one not without its problems, is found in Lord
Simonds dictum in John East7' to the effect it is as valid as any other test
of analogy to ask whether and for what reasons if may be desirable,in
light of existing social conditions, that the issues presented be decided
upon by some group other than those lawyers who happen to have been
granted to the A.G. for N.S. on February 28, 1986. The information as to the stated issue was
given the writer by the solicitor for Mr. Yeomans.
69. From 1905-1937. See Lochner v. New York (1905), 198 U.S. 45; 25 (U.S.) Supreme
Court Reporter 539.
70. Lochner,supra,25 (U.S.) Sup. Ct. R. 546-7.
71. Supra, note 64.
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appointed (for whatever reasons) to a s.96 court. There is, in my view, a
very compelling argument - backed up by the history of the common
law of employment - to the effect that, of all people you might care to
name, lawyers by their typical training, professional background and
personal work experiences are among the worst people you could
assemble to effect a set of social reforms designed and intended to prefer
(even if only in a limited context) the interests of labour over capital.
The alternative, of course, is to take the matter away from the judges
altogether by a constitutional amendment 72 that would empower the
provinces to appoint provincial tribunals to carry out any function within
provincial legislative competence. It may well come to that. How soon
may well depend on how the Supreme Court of Canada deals with this
case when it comes before it.
72. See, for example, The Constitution of Canada: A Suggested Amendment Relating to
ProvincialAdministrativeTribunals,(Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1983).

